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CASE NOTES
governing bodies to implement subtle schemes of economic discrimina-
tion; it also ignores the relationship between the location of a person's
home and the availability of public and private services fundamental
to the attainment of economic and social equality. For the foregoing
reasons, the Supreme Court should reconsider the rationale of Valtierra.
The federal low-income housing policy and future construction of low-
income housing will be jeopardized if, by referendum, a community
can exclude all federally assisted low-income housing projects. The
implications of such a proposition are far-reaching for, without federal
funds, the housing needs of the poor will never be met. It is therefore
urged that decisions pertaining to low-income housing, like the open-
housing legislation in Hunter, should be removed from the require-
ments of mandatory referenda approval.
THOMAS J. Mizo
Consumer Law—Class Actions—Waiver of Defense Clauses---Vas-
quez v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County. 1—The petitioners,
purchasers of food freezers and frozen food plans, brought a class suit,
on behalf of themselves and all other purchasers similarly situated,
against the seller and several assignee finance companies,' seeking
rescission of the sales contracts and damages. The petitioners charged
common law fraud' and violations of the California Retail Installment
Sales Act (Unruh Act). 4 They alleged that salesmen of the seller,
using a memorized sales presentation, had fraudulently represented
that (1) the seller's freezers were guaranteed for life; (2) the freezers
were being sold at reasonable retail prices; and (3) the frozen food
plans provided a seven-month food supply at one-seventh the normal
retail price. The petitioners contended that a class action' for fraud
was appropriate because identical misrepresentations concerning the
price and quality of the goods sold had been made to all class members
and because all class members had suffered similar damage.°
1 4 Cal. 2d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971).
2 The installment sales contracts of the defendant meat company had been routinely
assigned to three finance companies named as defendants. Id. at 806, 484 P.2d at 966-67,
94 Cal. Rptr. at 798-99.
3 See Ach v. Finkelstein, 264 Cal. App. 2d 667, 674, 70 Cal. Rptr. 472, 477 (1968),
for discussion of the California requirements for a fraud action.
4 Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1801 at seq. (West Supp. 1971), This statute regulates consumer
financing practices and prescribes specific civil penalties for violations. The violation al-
leged in the principal case was that the seller had required the execution of two sales
documents, a practice prohibited by §' 1803.2 of the Unruh Act, which requires that
every retail installment contract be contained in a single document.
5 Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 382 (West 1954). This section authorizes a representative
action in California.
6 In addition, the petitioners contended that a class action was the only suit they
could feasibly bring because of the small size of each individual claim. 4 Cal. 3d at 816,
484 P.2d at 974, 94 Cat Rptr. at 806.
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The defendant seller maintained that the factual uniformity
requisite to a class action was lacking because a wide variety of
freezers and food plans had been sold to the plaintiffs. In the alter-
native, the seller asserted that the Consumer Legal Remedies Act
(CLRA),7
 a recently enacted consumer remedies statute, precluded
the traditional class action sought by the petitioners. The defendant
assignee finance companies contended that a waiver of defense clause
in the assigned contracts rendered the contracts negotiable; that the
assignees were thus holders in due course under Section 3-302 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC); and that they were therefore
insulated from the plaintiffs' claims. Alternatively, the assignees con-
tended that Section 1804.2 of the Unruh Act barred an affirmative
suit by consumers against the assignees of contracts containing waiver
of defense clauses.'
The trial court overruled the seller's demurrer to the class action
based on the Unruh Act violation. However, the court sustained the
demurrer to the fraud action, insofar as the unnamed plaintiffs were
concerned, on the grounds that a consumer class action for fraud was
impermissible under existing California law.' On petition for a writ
of mandamus" to compel the trial court to vacate its order sustaining
the demurrer to the fraud action, the Supreme Court of California
HELD: the class action based on common law fraud should be rein-
7
 CBI. Civ. Code §§ 1750 et seq. (West Supp. 1971). This statute proscribes
specific misrepresentations by merchants and allows consumers to bring individual and
class actions, but only after the consumer has afforded the alleged wrongdoer an oppor-
tunity to make reparation. If restitution is made, no action for damages will lie. In-
junctive relief, however, is not limited by the same requirement. Cal, Civ. Code § 1782
(West Supp. 1971). This provision appears to reflect a legislative intent that California
consumers should seek injunctions rather than large damage recoveries. This approach
is of doubtful validity because an injunction, at best, merely cancels the consumer's
remaining obligation; it does not make the consumer whole. See Starrs, The Consumer
Class Action, 49 B.U.L. Rev. 407, 420 (1969), and Homburger, State Class Actions and
the Federal Rule, 71 _Colum. L. Rev. 609 (1971), for discussion of the relative merits
of injunctive, as opposed to damage, relief.
Cal. Civ. Code § 1804.2 (West Supp. 1971). Section 1804.2 provides in relevant
part:
An assignee of the seller's rights is subject to all claims and defenses of the buyer
against the seller . . . notwithstanding an agreement to the contrary [a waiver
of defense clause,) but the assignee's liability may not exceed the amount of the
debt owing to the assignee at the time that the defense is asserted against the
assignee. The rights of the buyer under this section can only be asserted as a
matter of defense to a claim by the assignee (emphasis added).
9 Vasquez v. Karp, No. 97734 (Cal. Super., filed September 23, 1969). The issue of
the alleged Unruh Act violation was not before the California Supreme Court. The
trial court's sustaining of the demurrer on the fraud cause of action as to unnamed
plaintiffs had the effect of making it a multiple plaintiff action for the named plaintiffs
rather than a class action. The trial court, although sympathetic to the plaintiffs' claims,
indicated that an appellate court was in a better position to permit a precedential class
action for fraud. 4 Cal. 3d at 806, 484 P.2d at 967, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
10 California law does not permit an interlocutory appeal to be taken from a trial
court's judgment when only' one of two causes of action has been dismissed. Cal. Code,
Civ. Pro. § 963 (West 1955) (now Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 904.1) (West Supp. 1971) .
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stated because there existed a reasonable possibility that plaintiffs
could prove the existence of a "community of interest" among all the
class members, named and unnamed, on the issue of fraud."
The Vasquez court found that the memorized representations
used by the seller's door-to-door salesmen, and their use of a stan-
dardized formula to compute the amount of food sold to each plaintiff,
had rendered the transactions similar enough to create an ascertain-
able class having a well-defined community of interest in questions
of law and fact." The court also noted that a class action was proper
in Vasquez because in the event the class action was successful, the
unnamed plaintiffs would not have to litigate numerous and substantial
questions in order to collect their share of the class judgment. The
court determined that the CLRA was inapplicable because the class
action had been brought before that statute took effect.'
Furthermore, the Vasquez court affirmed the trial court's ruling
that the finance companies were proper party defendants," stating
that even if the contracts were negotiable, the plaintiffs' allegation
that the finance companies had had notice of the seller's fraudulent
practices, if proven, would deprive the assignees of their holder in
due course status under UCC Section 3-302(1) (c)." As to the assign-
ees' claim of insulation under Unruh Act Section 1804.2, the court
concluded that this provision would not be applicable if the assignees
had had notice of the buyers' claims against the seller, or had worked
in concert with the seller. According to the court, if section 1804.2
were held applicable, consumers attempting to sue assignees would be
placed in a less advantageous position than merchant buyers; the
latter enjoy the protection of UCC Section 9-206, 1° which validates a
11 4 Cal. 3d at 813, 484 P.2d at 972, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
12 Id. at 809, 484 P.2d at 969, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 801. An ascertainable class and
a community of interest are the two principal class action requirements under California
law. See Darr v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 704, 433 P.2d 732, 739, 63 Cal. Rptr.
724, 731 (1967).
18 4 Cal. 3d at 818, 484 P.2d at 975, 94 CaI. Rptr. at 807. The court emphasized
that the CLRA was intended to be an exclusive remedy only for practices enumerated
in the statute. However, the court did not specifically indicate that the Vasquez allega-
tions would not be subject to the Act's provisions. Determining whether the allegations
of a consumer complaint sufficiently conform to the practices proscribed in the CLRA
may present some difficulty. The situation will occur when consumer plaintiffs seek to
avoid the cumbersome features of the CLRAa statute which appears to present more
problems than the traditional class action. Vasquez did not resolve this difficulty.
14 Id. at 822, 484 P.2d at 978, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
15 Id.
10 Id. at 824, 484 P.2d at 980, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 812. Section 9-206 of the ITC
validates waiver of defense clauses if the assignee takes for value, in good faith and
without notice of the buyer's claims against the seller. As enacted in California, section
9-206 provides:
Subject to any statute which establishes a different rule for . . . (con-
sumers,] an agreement by a buyer . . that be will not assert against an
assignee any claim or defense which he may have against the seller . .. fa
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waiver of defense clause only if the assignee takes without notice of
the buyer's claims against the seller.
Although jurisdictions vary as to the prerequisites for a class
action,n all jurisdictions require that a community of interest exist
within the class; that is, that the plaintiffs' allegations have a certain
degree of factual uniformity." The Vasquez court was able to discern
a community of interest sufficient to justify a class action, despite the
existence of a multiplicity of separate transactions, by stressing the
fact that the salesmen had used a memorized, standard sales mono-
logue in making the misrepresentations. Furthermore, the court em-
phasized that the different food plans had all been calculated from
the same "standard formula.""
While the memorized sales representations as to the quality and
price of freezers might indicate sufficient uniformity among those
representations to bind the class together,' the court's conclusion
that the use of a "standard formula" for calculations had rendered
the food plan representations sufficiently similar appears tenuous.
This finding stressed the uniform elements but minimized the effect
of the disparate elements of the food plan representations 21 By tak-
waiver of defense clause] is enforceable by an assignee who takes his assign-
ment for value, in good faith and without notice of a claim or defense ... .
Cal. Comm. Code 9-206 (West Supp. 1971).
17
 Courts normally will allow a class action in order to prevent a multiplicity of
lawsuits when numerous parties seek to litigate common questions of law and fact.
Class actions have opened the courts to plaintiffs having relatively small claims because
the consolidation of claims allows the costs of the lawsuit to be distributed among a
group of plaintiffs. Consumer grievances, in particular, lend themselves to class actions
because current mass marketing techniques often cause substantially similar harm to a
large group of consumers. 4 Cal. 3d at 808, 484 P.2d at 968-69, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 800-801.
18
 When the facts underlying the claims of the class substantially differ as to indi-
vidual plaintiffs, the burden placed on the parties, and the court, to litigate a number
of distinct factual or legal issues may negative the utility of a class action. For this
reason, courts require a community of interest among the plaintiffs.
19
 4 Cal, 3d at 813, 484 P.2d at 972, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
20 See Contract Buyers League v. F. & F. Investment, 48 F.R.D. 7 (N.D.
1969), where a group of black real estate purchasers were held to have the requisite
community of interest for a class action despite the defendant's allegation that there
were sixty-nine distinct issues of fact among the class members. The plaintiffs had
alleged, inter alia, that the defendant had made fraudulent representations as part of a
"blockbusting" scheme. The court noted that the same violations were alleged in each
transaction and that an overall conspiracy of blockbusting seemed to be at work. In
granting the action, the court stated that "there are undoubtedly individual questions
with respect to particular contracts, and ... though these individualized questions will
relate primarily to damages, they may also, to a lesser degree, pertain to liability." 48
F.R.D. at 12. But see Slakey Brothers Sacramento, Inc. v. Parker, 65 Cal. App. 2d
205, 71 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1968) where the plaintiff-creditors brought a class action for
deceit against a defendant-debtor who had allegedly conspired to conceal his financial
instability in order to delay the creditors' foreclosure efforts. The court held that a
class action would not lie because the misrepresentations had been communicated in a
variety of ways, and because the subjective element of the action, the debtor's state of
mind, was a particularly individual factor.
21 Varying proportions of meat, vegetables and juices were included in several dif-
ferent food plans. Each plaintiff apparently advised the salesman of his own food costs.
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ing such an approach, the court appears to have resolved any existing
doubt in favor of the class plaintiffs in order to provide them a rea-
sonable opportunity to prove their allegations. This approach results
in an expansion of the community of interest concept."
In finding the requisite community of interest, the court relied
heavily on Darr v. Yellow Cab Co. 23
 In that case, several thousand
taxi cab riders had brought a class action in order to recover numer-
ous illegally overcharged fares of an identical percentage. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court found a community of interest among the class
by focusing on the post-judgment stage of the class action, and not on
the similarity of the plaintiffs' claims. The Darr court assumed argu-
endo that the class action would be successful and then attempted to
determine what new facts and issues each unnamed class member
would need to litigate in order to execute his share of the judgment.
It found that the unnamed plaintiffs could recover their portion of
the judgment without additional litigation and that, therefore, there
existed the community of interest requisite for a class action."
The Vasquez court employed the approach taken in Darr but
interpreted that case as providing a wide latitude in establishing a
community of interest. The court stated:
The mere fact that separate transactions are involved does
not of itself preclude a finding of the requisite community
of interest so long as every member of the alleged class
would not be required to litigate numerous and substantial
questions to determine his individual right to recover subse-
quent to the rendering of any class judgment. . . .25
Under this test, only the existence of several significant collateral
issues would foreclose the class action to some or all of the unnamed
class members," whereas, under Darr, the need to litigate any addi-
The salesmen then made individual calculations, using a standard formula. The uniformity
in these representations, found by the court on the strength of this standard formula,
appears to go beyond the uniformity found with respect to the representations made
regarding the freezers. The latter representations did not involve individual computations,
only a choice of models. 4 Cal. 3d at 812-13, 484 P.2d at 971-72, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 803-04.
22 It must he remembered, however, that each class action must be taken on its
own facts in order to determine whether there is sufficient uniformity to show a com-
munity of interest. Hence the court is vested with substantial discretion in deciding this
issue.
28 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
24 Id. at 704-05, 433 P.2d at 739, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 731.
25 4 Cal. 3d at 809, 484 P.2d at 969, 94 Cal. Rptr, at 801 (emphasis added).
26 4 Cal. 3d at 815, 484 P.2d at 973-74, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 805-06. Such a result
appears to place the burden of persuasion on the defendant rather than the plaintiffs.
A lack of factual uniformity within the class may lead to intraclass disagreement
concerning offers of settlement or the actual conduct of the action. A factually deviant
subclass might, for example, seek to advance broader allegations to encompass its claims
while core class members, those with a high degree of uniformity in their fact pattern,
might want to advance narrower claims to limit their evidentiary burden. For a dis-
cussion of this point see Stara, supra note 7, at 501-03. See also Darr v. Yellow Cab
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tional issues would apparently bar the action. Vasquez, then, signals
an important expansion in the availability of the class action. Use of
the "numerous and substantial" criterion to determine community of
interest may well open the courts to many borderline cases having
considerable factual deviation.
The real utility of pretrial speculation concerning the practic-
ability of post-judgment execution is that this approach enables the
court to look beyond the question of factual uniformity to determine
whether the law would treat the plaintiffs uniformly in their execution
of the class judgment." By analyzing the execution potential before
the trial, the court is better able to judge whether the class is held
together tightly enough to litigate the common issues fairly and effec-
tively, without need for relitigation. The flexibility of the Vasquez
approach is a salutary departure from the reluctance of other courts
to find a community of interest in situations even more clearly
uniform than that in the principal case."
In ruling that the finance companies were proper party defen-
dants," the Vasquez court considered a recurring problem in con-
sumer law—the validity and effect of a waiver of defense clause, in
which the buyer agrees not to raise against an assignee any claims or
defenses he may have against the seller. The finance companies con-
tended that, because waiver of defense clauses existed in the assigned
contracts, the companies were free of the plaintiffs' claims and there-
fore were not proper party defendants. The court, however, deter-
mined that the plaintiffs' allegations that the assignees had had notice
of the buyers' claims and had acted in concert with the seller, if
proven, would invalidate the waiver of defense clauses, thereby mak-
ing the assignees proper defendants.
In a nonconsumer commercial transaction, the standards of Sec-
tion 9-206 of the UCC are applied to determine the validity of a waiver
of defense clause. These standards require that the assignee take in
Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 709, 433 P.2d 732, 742-43, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724, 734-35 (1967) ; Chance
v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 58 Cal. 2d 275, 284, 373 P.2d 849, 853-54, 23
Cal. Rptr. 761, 765-66 (1962); Note, Developments In The Law—Multiparty Litigation
In The Federal Courts, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 939 (1958); Chafe; Some Problems of
Equity 209, 223 (1st ed. 1950).
2? This approach also more clearly separates matters of substance and procedure.
The substance of the claims is not examined directly; rather, the court examines how
easily an execution could be granted to each claimant, assuming the substantive correct-
ness of the class' claims. But see Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass'n, 414 F,2d 311,
317 (1st Cir. 1969), where the court rejected prejddgment speculation as to the execu-
tion potential of all the class members.
28 See Hall v. Coburn Corp. of America, 26 N.Y.2d 396, 259 N.E.2d 720, 311
N.Y,S.2d 281 (1970), where the court refused to find a community of interest despite
allegations that identical statutory violations appeared in all the defendant's contracts.
29 Although the trial court held that the finance companies were proper defendants,
and the issue was technically not on appeal, it had been "extensively briefed" and
would "undoubtedly arise at the trial" so the California Supreme Court discussed it




good faith and without knowledge of a buyer's claim or defense against
the seller. Section 9-206, however, provides that it will be "subject to"
any consumer statute which establishes a "different rule" for waiver
of defense clauses. The assignees in Vasquez, in an attempt to avoid
the standards of section 9-206, asserted that Section 1804.2 of the
Unruh Act, established such a "different rule." Section 1804.2 invali-
dates waiver of defense clauses but precludes the buyer from asserting
his rights against the assignee in an affirmative suit. In effect then,
section 1804.2 invalidates a waiver of defense clause only when an
assignee sues the buyer. Consequently, if section 1804.2 alone were
found applicable in Vasquez, the plaintiffs would not be able to assert
that the waiver of defense clauses were invalid for the reason that the
assignees lacked good faith and had had knowledge of the buyers'
claims against the seller. However, this clearly would be possible under
UCC Section 9-206, which specifically states that waiver of defense
clauses are valid only if the assignee takes in good faith and without
knowledge of the buyer's claims against the seller. Furthermore, the
provision does not state that the purchaser's rights against the assignee
can be asserted only in defense to the assignee's claim.
Faced with this conflict, the court concluded that the standards
of section 9-206 would apply and that the assignees were therefore
proper party defendants. The court determined that if it held section
1804.2 to be a "different rule" applicable to these assignees, it would
"bestow upon them immunities . . . against consumers unavailable
to . . . [assignees] in the ordinary commercial transaction."" This
result would be detrimental to consumers and contrary to the policy
expressed in the Unruh Act. 3 ' The court also noted that section
1804.2 had been modeled after a section" of the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code (UCCC) intended to bar affirmative product liability
suits against financial institution assignees, but not fraud actions for
contract rescission and damages."
The Vasquez court appears to have applied section 9-206 cor-
rectly. The UCC Official Comment to section 9-206 states that this
provision is "expressly made subject to any statute ... which may
restrict the waiver's effectiveness in the case of a [consumer].""
88 4 Cal. 3d at 832-24, 484 P.2d at 979, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
81 The court also indicated that, because a judgment against the seller is often
meaningless, consumers must have access to credit institution assignees that either par-
ticipate or acquiesce in the seller's fraudulent practices. 4 Cal. 3d at 821-22, 484 P.2d
at 978, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
82 Uniform Consumer Credit Code § 2-404, Alternative A thereinafter cited as
UCCC].
83 This suggested interpretation was made in an amicus brief which asserted that
the drafters of the UCCC had not discussed the possibility that this limitation might
apply in an action to rescind a contract fraudulently induced. 4 Cal. 3d at 824, 484
P.2d at 979, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
34 UCC § 9-206, Comment 1 (emphasis added). An earlier version of § 9-206 in-
validated the waiver of defense clause. See Murphy, Another "Assault on the Citadel":
Limiting the Use of Negotiable Notes and Waiver-of-Defense Clauses in Consumer Sales,
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Thus it would seem illogical to hold another statute as supplying a
"different rule" for consumers, one which does not restrict, but rather
appears to expand, the effectiveness of waiver of defense clauses in
affirmative consumer suits. In enacting both section 1804.2 and section
9-206, the legislature did not make its intended policy on waiver of
defense clauses clear." The Vasquez court thus gave its own inter-
pretation of the legislative intent behind the enactment of the Unruh
Act." The court ruled that an interpretation of a specific provision
of this consumer protection statute antipathetic to consumer claims
would be inconsistent with the overall legislative purpose of the Act.
The issues settled in Vasquez are far-reaching. In the contro-
versial area of class actions, the California Supreme Court commend-
ably has indicated a willingness to entertain a class suit for common
law fraud despite the difficult and subjective evidentiary problems in-
volved. The court's expansion of the community of interest concept
will serve to make the class action a more effective means of obtaining
consumer relief. In the equally controversial area of waiver of defense
clauses, the court has resolved an ambiguous legislative position which
appeared to immunize assignees of consumer sales contracts containing
such clauses against affirmative suit by consumers. The court's holding
requires finance companies to investigate their assignors and affirms
"the insistence of the law that honesty and enterprise must remain
compatible.""
HARRY A. PIERCE
29 Ohio St. L.J. 667, 679 (1968). Pre-UCC law of assignment in California was, in part,
governed by American Nat'l Bank of San Francisco v. A.G. Sommerville, Inc., 191 Cal.
364, 216 P. 376 (1923), where the court refused to validate a waiver of defense clause
that would have precluded defenses of fraud and failure of consideration. See Project:
California Chattel Security and Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code, 8
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 806, 970-72 (1961) for an analysis of § 9-206 in relation to Sommerville
and the Unruh Act.
85 See Hogan, Integrating the UCCC and the UCC—Limitations of Creditors'
Agreements and Practices, 33 Law & Contemp. Prob. 686 (1968), for a discussion of the
interaction between UCC Section 9-206 and UCCC Section 2-404, Alternative A. See also
Jordan and Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 387,
436-38 (1968).
86 While the Vasquez court found Unruh Act Section 1804.2 inapplicable because
it allowed the assignee to be insulated from affirmative suit despite his lack of good
faith and knowledge of the buyer's claims against the seller, there does exist a statute
in California which specifically insulates the assignee despite his lack of good faith. See
the Automobile Sales Finance Act, Cal. Civ. Code # 2983.5 (West Supp. 1971), which
provides that an assignee is insulated "whether or not he acquires the contract in good
faith ...."
37 4 Cal. 3d at 825, 484 P.2d at 980, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
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